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The Sword and the Shield: Disunity Over the
Application of the Clean Water Act’s Permit Shield
Provision
INTRODUCTION
The vast waters of America swirled, ebbed, and flowed in a sad, murky
state in the summer of 1969.1 Volatile pollutants dumped for decades into
the nation’s waterways and waterbodies were in such high concentration
that one river literally caught fire.2 This pollution crisis was not new. Prior
to 1969, Congress made numerous attempts to curb the discharge of
pollution into America’s waters, but these efforts fell short, failing to
manage the existing high levels of water pollution.3 President Lyndon B.
Johnson auspiciously declared that water pollution would “be doomed” in
the 20th century when he signed the Water Quality Act of 1965.4 However,
the events of June 1969 contradicted President Johnson’s bold assertion
when the nation discovered the shocking extent of the pollution problem
in America. In the Cuyahoga River, an ember spark ignited its polluted
waters, lit the river ablaze, and fueled the fire for comprehensive, topdown water pollution legislative reform.5
This comprehensive congressional reform resulted in the Clean Water
Act (CWA), which substantially reformed the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948.6 The CWA, which Congress passed over a veto from
President Nixon, altered the way America regulated water pollution.7 In the
decades since its passage, the substantially amended CWA has provided
Americans with cleaner, safer water;8 although Americans today generally
enjoy cleaner water across the country, the discharge of pollutants remains
ever present and continues to contaminate the waterways and waterbodies
Copyright 2019, by WESLEY E. DAVIS.
1. Julie Grant, How A Burning River Helped Create the Clean Water Act,
ALLEGHENY FRONT (Apr. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/9E7P-9Y9L.
2. Id.
3. EPA, LAWS & REGULATIONS, History of the Clean Water Act, https://
perma.cc/7CK9-UZP5 (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
4. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Water Quality Act of
1965, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://perma.cc/J2MJ-QT5X (last visited Oct.
15, 2017).
5. Grant, supra note 1.
6. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1972).
7. LYNN M. GALLAGHER & LEONARD A. MILLER, CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK
2 (2d ed. 1996).
8. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2d ed. 2002).
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of America.9 The continuity of water pollution illuminates a hard truth:
Congress recognized the unrealistic expectation that no facility, industrial
process, or person would ever pollute a water source.10 As a result, the
CWA provides for a wide range of guidelines, procedures, and regulations
for polluters to follow when discharging pollutants.11
The CWA provides the federal government and the states with a
pollution permitting system known as the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES).12 The NPDES statutory regime—one of the
many permitting provisions of the CWA, and the statute focused on by this
Case Note—addresses how facilities may lawfully obtain permits to
discharge pollutants from a point source into a waterbody.13 The NPDES
regime also contains a more ambiguous section known as the “permit
shield” provision, which provides NPDES permit holders protection from
civil and criminal liability if they comply with the specifications and
regulations of their NPDES permits.14 It is this balancing act of regulatory
oversight and industry liability protection that comprises the NPDES
regulatory scheme today.
This Case Note addresses a federal circuit split between the U.S.
Courts of Appeal for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits over the application of
the CWA permit shield provision and argues for a broader interpretation
of the CWA permit shield that, on its face, provides greater protection to
industry but allows permit issuing authorities to regulate state water
quality standards on a more particularized level. Part I illustrates the
relationship between the NPDES permitting process and the CWA permit
shield protection provision and presents early case law and administrative
decisions that formed the basis of the judiciary’s interpretation of the
permit shield provision’s application. Part II examines the circuit split
between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and the resulting disunity over the
applicability of the CWA permit shield defense with respect to NPDES
permit holders when the permit sets out specific effluent limitations and
9. EPA, supra note 3.
10. JOEL M. GROSS & KERRI L. STELCEN, CLEAN WATER ACT 15 (2d ed. 2012).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (1987).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2019). (Note to the reader: This Case Note will
commonly refer to the federal permit issuing authority, NPDES. When states
apply for and receive authorization to implement their own permit issuing and
regulatory authority, the “N” in NPDES often changes to the first letter of the
state. For example, the state of Louisiana received authorization for its pollution
discharge elimination system in 1996, and it is referred to as “LPDES” instead of
“NPDES.” Another example: West Virginia’s system is titled “WVPDES.”).”
13. Id.
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2019).
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merely incorporates state water quality standards by reference. Part III
discusses the issues and ambiguity resulting from the dueling Circuit
opinions. Part IV explains why the Fourth Circuit decision, subject to some
limitations, promotes a more effective model of cooperative federalism
that honors the state role envisioned by the CWA without unfairly
discriminating against industry and business. Finally, Part V concludes by
recognizing the benefits of a limited Fourth Circuit rationale.
I. BACKGROUND
Much like the waterways it protects, the Clean Water Act contains a
series of regulatory “tributaries” that make difficult the successful
navigation of the CWA’s regulatory framework and provide challenges for
regulators and regulated parties alike. Navigation of this framework is
subject to the confluence of legislative amendments, administrative
implementation, and judicial interpretation.
A. The Many Tributaries of the Clean Water Act
The CWA provides regulations and guidelines focused on the control
of water pollution, the discharge of pollutants, and the protection of
America’s waters.15 The CWA embodies a cooperative form of federalism
through the NPDES system that involves federal, state, and local entities
working in concert to set water quality requirements, manage permit
programs, and set effluent limitation standards and guidelines for water
pollutants.16 The CWA, through the NPDES program, provides a statutory
regime that addresses liability and procedural requirements that regulatory
authorities, permit enforcers, and regulated parties must follow.17 The
multifaceted aspects of this statutory and regulatory framework will be
discussed herein.
1. Liability under the Clean Water Act
The CWA establishes a default regime of strict liability for facilities
and natural persons that discharge pollutants into a waterbody.18 Although
Congress, at the time of passage, intended for the CWA to ultimately
eliminate all pollutants present in the nation’s waterways, Congress
recognized the technological infeasibility of prohibiting all pollutants in
15.
16.
17.
18.

33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1987).
Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2019).
Id.
Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
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the short term and the severe burdens such a prohibition would have on
business, industry, and the economy as a whole.19 As a result, Congress
carved out exceptions within the statutory language of the CWA. The crux
of the CWA’s strict liability is found in section 301(a), which provides
that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful”
unless the discharge complies with exceptions under the CWA.20 The
primary exception to liability imposed by the CWA is the section 402
NPDES permitting system.21
Under section 402 of the CWA, the NPDES permitting system provides
effluent limitations22 on the amount of pollutants that individuals or industry
can discharge from a point source into a waterbody.23 An “effluent
limitation” is the primary enforcement mechanism NPDES permitting
authorities employ to restrict and control the amount of pollutants
discharged into a particular waterbody.24 The effluent limitations utilized
during the permit review process are derived from effluent limitation
guidelines; the guidelines vary depending on the level of pollutant present
in the water and the availability of current pollutant control technologies.25
The scope of “waterbodies” covered by the CWA includes traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters, and wetlands adjacent to either
traditional navigable waters or interstate waters.26 Waterbodies classified
as non-navigable tributaries that lead to traditional navigable waters that
are relatively permanent, as well as wetlands that directly abut relatively
permanent waters also fall under the CWA’s purview.27 Further still,
waters outside these classifications may receive CWA protection if a fact19. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10.
20. Clean Water Act § 301(a) (“[e]xcept as in compliance with this section
and [other sections of the Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall
be unlawful.”).
21. DIETRICH H. EARNHART & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, POLLUTION LIMITS
AND POLLUTER’S EFFORTS TO COMPLY: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT 6 (2011).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2019).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2019). 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(c) (2019).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2019) (The term "effluent limitation" means any
restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous
zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance).
25. Id.
26. Guidance to Identify Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/MQ4Y-YCT9 (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
27. Id.
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specific analysis determines the existence of a “significant nexus” to
traditional navigable waters or interstate waters.28 The legislative history
indicates that Congress intended the NPDES permit to be one of the few
means by which a discharger of pollutants from a point source may escape
the strict liability of CWA section 301(a).29 While the CWA statutorily
created the NPDES permitting system, the EPA and state permitting
authorities enjoy some discretion in the system’s implementation.
2. The Mechanics of the NPDES Permitting System
The NPDES permitting system embodies a model of cooperative
federalism between the federal government, states, and local
municipalities.30 Congress authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to act as the administrator of the NPDES permitting
program, while also empowering the EPA to authorize states to administer
state-level NPDES permit programs.31 To date, the EPA has authorized
forty states and several Native American tribal territories to create,
administer, and maintain NPDES programs.32 In states and territories that
do not have authorization to administer a NPDES permitting program, one
of ten regional offices maintained by the EPA reviews, authorizes, and
issues permits directly.33 States that seek permit program authorization
have clear guidelines to follow in order to receive permitting authority.34
Unauthorized states wishing to establish and administer their own
NPDES permit programs must seek approval from the EPA under the
CWA.35 This process requires a state’s governor to submit a description of
the proposed permitting program the state plans to implement to the EPA’s
administrator.36 Legal counsel on behalf of the state’s water-pollution
28. Id. (Tributaries to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters,
wetlands adjacent to jurisdictional tributaries to traditional navigable waters or
interstate waters. Also includes waters that fall under the "other waters" category
of the regulations. The guidance divides these waters into two categories, those
that are physically proximate to other jurisdictional waters and those that are not,
and discusses how each category should be evaluated).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995).
30. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
31. ROBIN K. CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION:
LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY
ENVIRONMENT 27 (2d ed. 2009).
32. GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 7, at 15.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2019).
36. Id.
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control authority must then prove to the EPA that the state laws provide
the state-administered NPDES program with sufficient authority to
properly administer the program.37 The CWA statutorily obligates the
EPA to approve a state program when it finds that state laws provide the
proposed program with sufficient measures to comply with the EPA’s
effluent limitations requirements.38
Upon approval of a state-administered NPDES program, the EPA
suspends all federal permitting authority within the state.39 It is at this stage
that states have primacy40 over the administration of the NPDES permit
program; however, such “state primacy” is not absolute.41 Although the
CWA permits the EPA Administrator to “encourage cooperative activities
by the States for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution,”
the EPA still retains federal standard setting and permitting authority.42 As
a result, states must enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
the EPA concerning the water quality standards of the state permit
program.43 The MOA refers specifically to state water quality standards
determined by state permitting authorities rather than effluent limitation
guidelines promulgated by the EPA.44
The states must submit copies of every permit application and notice
of every action with respect to each permit application to the EPA.45
Furthermore, the EPA retains the power to veto a state permit under
section 402(d) and issue its own permit for a polluting facility if a state
fails to meet the minimum regulatory requirements set by the EPA.46
While states must abide by the minimum federal water quality
standards—initially in the form of effluent limitation guidelines set by the
EPA—states are free to impose more stringent requirements than those
demanded at the federal level, which often results in significant differences
between state permitting programs and their federal counterparts.47 The
37. Id.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (2019). Id. at 1342(b).
39. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
40. Id. Primacy in this context means it is the state government, rather than the
federal government, that engages in risk assessments, promulgates regulations,
issues permits, and brings enforcement actions for NPDES permit violations upon
EPA approval of a state NPDES program.
41. Id.
42. GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 7, at 18.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2019); GALLAGHER & MILLER supra note 7, at 19.
47. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN,supra note 21, at 7.
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type of permit determines the scope of regulatory enforcement from the
permit issuing authority and the level of compliance the permit holder
must maintain.
3. Types of NPDES Permits: Individual and General
NPDES permits target substantive discharge of pollutants from a point
source into a waterbody. For example, any facility that adds pollutants
resulting from its industrial processes through a pipe into a stream or lake
must have a NPDES permit to discharge those pollutants.48 Pollutant
sources that are not considered “point sources,” such as discharges into
sewer systems or runoff that does not collect into ditches, are not subject
to NPDES permits.49
The two types of NPDES permits for which a facility can apply are
individual permits and general permits. Starting with the latter, a general
permit applies to multiple facilities within similar operating parameters
located within the same geographical region.50 General permits are more
cost-effective for both the applying facility and permit issuing authority
than individual permits because a single permit can cover multiple
facilities.51 A facility may apply for a general permit if its pollutant
discharges meet the minimum, blanket requirements set forth by the
general permitting authority.52 If a facility’s discharges do not meet these
requirements the facility must apply for an individual permit specific to its
discharge needs.53
Permitting authorities develop and issue an individual permit for a
specific facility based on information disclosed in the permit application
regarding the types of pollutants the facility produces or intends to
produce.54 Individual permits expire after five years and often contain
effluent limitations specific to the applicant seeking a permit or the water
source receiving the applicant’s pollutant discharge.55 In this context, a
permitting authority must consider technology-based effluent limitations.56
48. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the
Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 415 (2007).
49. Id.
50. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10, at 33.
51. Id.
52. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
53. Id.
54. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10, at 33.
55. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
56. NPDES Permit Limits – TBELs & WQBELs, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/E6L6-K3MN (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
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Technology-based effluent limitations set minimum requirements that
determine the treatment of pollutants released through point source
discharges.57 These effluent limitations allow the discharger to use any
available control technique to meet the required limits.58 When only
implementing technology-based effluent limitations on NPDES permits
proves to be inadequate to maintain water quality standards, CWA section
303(d) provides states with a procedural method to develop and implement
total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) to preserve water quality standards.59
A TMDL serves to identify the amount of a specific pollutant or
component of a pollutant that a polluter may discharge into a waterbody
without compromising the water quality standards of the waterbody
itself.60 The TMDL analysis builds in a margin of safety for its water
quality preservation allocations by including pollutants from nonpoint
sources and naturally occurring environmental sources.61 Necessarily, and
unsurprisingly, water-quality based limits are also of concern during the
TMDL analysis.62
4. The Intersection of State Water Quality Standards and TMDLS
While much of the analysis under the CWA looks to regulate pollution
at the source, section 303 focuses on the water quality of the receiving
waterbodies.63 This section holds states accountable for designating water
quality standards for all waters within their respective boundaries.64 The
section explicitly provides that states must set these water quality
standards regardless of the source of pollution entering the waters.65 The
judiciary has long recognized these water quality standards to serve “as a
supplementary basis” for effluent limitations to further regulate point
source discharges from reducing water quality below the acceptable
levels.66

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. HOUCK, supra note 8, at 76.
60. Id. at 79.
61. Id. at 80.
62. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 56.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
64. Roger Flynn, New Life for Impaired Waters: Realizing the Goal to
“Restore” the Nation’s Waters Under the Clean Water Act, 10 WYO. L. REV. 35,
42 (2010).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Section 303 lays out three components of all state water quality
programs: (1) states must establish the specific “designated uses” of its
waters;67 (2) states must promulgate the “numeric and narrative” water
quality conditions that govern, among other things, limitations on
pollutant levels to preserve the designated uses of the water;68 and (3)
states must adopt “antidegradation” policies to prevent any further
deterioration of water quality.69 These state water quality provisions serve
as independent and individually enforceable standards under federal law.70
As a result, permit issuing agencies must consider the potential impact
on state water quality of every potential discharge from a point source
facility.71 If a permit issuing authority anticipates disclosed discharges will
violate state water quality standards, section 303 requires the permit
authority to issue stricter standards.72 Despite the complex procedural and
substantive guidelines governing NPDES permit and state water quality
standards, a regulatory provision within the CWA—dubbed the permit
shield” provision—serves to protect permit holders from liability when
certain criteria are met.
B. The Clean Water Act “Permit Shield” Provision
As mentioned, the Clean Water Act contains a “permit shield”
provision that provides NPDES permit holders protection from liability,
such as civil lawsuits and regulatory enforcement actions.73 Specifically,
33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) of the CWA states that compliance with an NPDES
permit issued pursuant to this section is viewed as compliance with the
CWA.74 This language, on its face, is ambiguous and subject to different
interpretations. The legislative history suggests that the permit shield
provision is designed to assuage the fears of NPDES permit holders that
every subsequent enactment of a regulation might subject them to a civil
suit or a state enforcement action.75 Treading similar waters, the Supreme

67. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).
68. Id.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000).
70. Flynn, supra note 64.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2019).
74. Id.
75. (“Through amendments to the Act in 1977 and additional agency
regulations and interpretations, numerous categories of waters and activities were
classified as exempt from permit requirements under the Act”). S. REP. NO. 111-
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Court held in 1977 that the permit shield provision protects permit holders
from various subsequent revisions of regulations and prevents permit
holders from litigating over whether their current, valid permit is subject
to the newer regulatory standards.76
In light of the legislative intent and subsequent Supreme Court
interpretation, the “permit shield defense” doctrine has developed further
through federal case law and administrative decisions by the EPA.77
Despite four decades of judicial and administrative review, the application
of the permit shield doctrine remains ambiguous and continues to be a
source of much litigation and regulatory action today.
II. EARLY GUIDANCE: ATLANTIC STATES, IN RE KETCHIKAN, & PINEY RUN
Permit holders, regardless of the issuing authority, must comply with
effluent limitations on pollutant discharges and various monitoring,
testing, and reporting requirements.78 The guidance provided from three
major sources, the Second Circuit’s decision in Atlantic States, the EPA’s
administrative decision in Ketchikan, and the Fourth Circuit’s two-factor
test opined in Piney Run have allowed the judiciary, regulatory agencies,
and permit holders alike to, for the most part, manage their expectations
with respect to the NPDES permitting process. The result is that NPDES
administrative decisions and case law generally conclude that NPDES
permit holders are shielded from CWA liability for discharges that are in
compliance with express limitations of its permit.79
Additionally, courts have extended the permit shield doctrine to
insulate valid permit holders from liability for discharges of pollutants that
they disclosed to the permitting authority during the application process
but that were not otherwise listed in the permit, provided that such
discharges are reasonably anticipated by80 or within the reasonable
contemplation of the permitting authority at the time the permit issues.81
361 No. 92-911, at 3 (2010) (citing EPA, Clean Water Section 404 Program
Definition and Permit Exemptions, Final Rule, 53 FED. REG. 20764 (June 6, 1988).
76. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977).
77. Id.
78. See Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353
(2nd Cir. 1993).
79. Atlantic States Legal Found. 12 F.3d 353 (2nd Cir. 1993); Ketchikan Pulp
Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 606 (EAB 1998); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. City Comm’rs, 268
F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); Julie Kaplan, Does EPA’s View of the CWA Permit
Shield Too Much? (2013), https://perma.cc/MN93-49FA.
80. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 606 (EAB 1998).
81. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. City Comm’rs, 268 F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
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District Courts, administrative agencies, and permit seekers frequently
rely upon these cases and foundational decisions to determine the scope of
a NPDES permit.
A. Atlantic States: Extending the Permit
The Second Circuit provided in Atlantic States an avenue for permit
holders to discharge pollutants not otherwise listed in their active NPDES
permit, as long as the permit holders observe proper reporting and
mandatory disclosure requirements during the permit application
process.82 In this case, an environmental group known as Atlantic States
brought suit claiming that Eastman Kodak violated the CWA by exceeding
the limitations on its effluent discharges and by discharging sixteen
different pollutants into the Genesee River that were not listed in Kodak’s
NPDES permit.83 The court rejected Atlantic States’ argument that section
301 of the CWA prohibited the discharge of pollutants not expressly
authorized by an NPDES permit.84
Instead, the Second Circuit recognized that NPDES permits identify
and impose limitations on pollutants that are the most hazardous to human
health and environmental water quality.85 The numerous disclosure and
reporting requirements, the court reasoned, adequately extended the scope
of NPDES coverage to the discharge of unlisted pollutants.86 This
expansion of NPDES coverage holds true to the legislative rationale
behind the permit shield provision because reporting and full disclosure is
a mandatory requirement for the permit shield defense. Cheating these

82. Id. at 357.
83. Id. at 355–56.
84. Id. at 357–58.
85. Id. at 357.
86. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357
(2nd Cir. 1993):
EPA did not intend to require water quality-based permit limitations on
all pollutants contained in a discharge . . . The proper interpretation of
the regulations is that developing water quality-based limitations is a
step-by-step process….[W]ater quality-based limits are established
where the permitting authority reasonably anticipates the discharge of
pollutants by the permittee at levels that have the reasonable potential to
cause or contribute to an excursion above any state water quality
criterion.
(quoting Memorandum from Director, Office of Wastewater Enforcement and
Compliance to Water Management Division Directors, Regions I–X, at 2–3 (Aug.
14, 1992).
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requirements renders the permit shield provision inapplicable and subjects
the permit holder to liability, thus foreclosing any permit shield defense.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Atlantic States expanded the scope
of NPDES permits beyond the express, black-letter language within the
four corners of a permit. Moreover, this decision expanded the
applicability of the permit shield defense based upon the correlation
between compliance and invocation of the permit shield defense. Selfreporting and full disclosure, simply put, allow for non-permitted
expansion of effluent discharge. Under Atlantic States, the more ways a
facility can comply with its NPDES permit, the more likely it can invoke
the permit shield provision and escape liability. Atlantic States fell in line
with EPA guidance policies on this issue, and was followed by a major
administrative decision by the EPA Environmental Appeals Board in
Ketchikan.87
B. In re Ketchikan: Reasonable Anticipation of Permitting Authority
The EPA Environmental Appeals Board determined that the NPDES
permit not only covered pollutants actually listed in the permit itself but
included any pollutants disclosed to the permitting authority during the
application process.88 This effectively meant that facilities with NPDES
permits could discharge pollutants that were not listed in their issued
permit but that still fell within the scope of a NPDES permit (and the
permit shield defense), as long as the facilities made adequate disclosures
to the proper permit issuing authority.89 The Board reached this conclusion
because it was virtually impossible to identify and ascertain every
chemical element present within a given pollutant discharge, and, as a
result, the EPA determined that the “goals of the CWA may be more
effectively achieved by focusing on the chief pollutants and waste streams
established in effluent guidelines and disclosed by permittees in their
permit applications.”90
The Board reasoned that a proper interpretation of the CWA
regulatory scheme was one in which “[w]ater quality based limits are
established where the permitting authority reasonably anticipates the
discharge of pollutants by the permittee at levels that have the reasonable

87.
88.
89.
90.

Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998).
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 618.
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potential to cause or contribute to an excursion above any state water
quality criterion.”91
As a result of the EPA’s decision in Ketchikan, NPDES permitting
authorities and facilities seeking a permit have a structured process to
follow.92 Under this procedural structure: (1) an applicant informs the
permitting authority of the nature of its effluent discharges; (2) the
permitting authority subsequently engages in an environmental risk
assessment; and (3) the permitting authority places limitations on
pollutants it “reasonably anticipates” could adversely impact the
environmental quality of the affected waterbody.93 The remaining
limitation on the permit holder's ability to discharge pollutants simply
requires that the discharges must be reasonably anticipated by, or within
the reasonable contemplation of, the permitting authority.94 As long as a
permit holder complies with the CWA’s reporting and disclosure
requirements, it may discharge pollutants not expressly disclosed in the
permit.95 To the extent that a permit holder discharges a pollutant that it
failed to report or disclose, the permit holder violates their NPDES permit
and the CWA, and cannot invoke the CWA permit shield defense.96
The Ketchikan decision further broadened the scope of NPDES
permits by distilling the reasoning behind the Second Circuit’s decision in
Atlantic States into a multi-factor procedure for both permit seekers and
permit issuing authorities to follow, while providing a level of discretion
to the permit issuing authority when formulating what it “reasonably
anticipates” could harm the environment or violate state water quality
91. Id. at 619 (quoting Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12
F.3d 353, 358 (2nd Cir. 1993)).
92. EPA, Policy Statement on Scope of Discharge Authorization and Shield
Associated with NPDES Permits, at 2-3, (July 1, 1994). (Specifically outlining
that the CWA permit shield extends to cover 1) Pollutants specifically limited in
the permit or pollutants which the permit, fact sheet, or administrative record
explicitly identified as controlled through indicator parameters; 2) Pollutants for
which the permit authority has not established limits or other permit conditions,
but which are specifically identified in writing as present in facility discharges
during the permit application process; and contained in the administrative record
which is available to the public; and 3) Pollutants not identified as present but
which are constituents of waste streams, operations or processes that were clearly
identified in writing during the permit application process and contained in the
administrative record which is available to the public).
93. Stephanie Rich, Troubled Water: An Examination of the NPDES Permit
Shield, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 250 (2016).
94. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 619 (EAB 1998).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 620.
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standards. This result further extends the scope of NPDES permits and the
permit shield defense to cover expressly listed pollutants, unlisted
pollutants, and pollutant discharges that permitting agencies may
“reasonably anticipate.”
C. Piney Run: Fourth Circuit Guides the Federal Courts
In Piney Run, the Fourth Circuit, deferring to the EPA’s decision in
Ketchikan, created a two-part test to determine if NPDES permit holders
were in compliance with their permits and therefore shielded from liability
under the CWA.97 This test, simple on its face, asks: (1) whether the
discharger disclosed the pollutants to the permitting agency, and (2) whether
the discharge was within the “reasonable contemplation” of that agency.98
In Piney Run, an environmental group filed suit against a Maryland county
alleging that a county-operated waste processing facility violated the CWA
by discharging warm water into the Piney Run stream.99 The district court
found that the county facility violated its NPDES permit because the
discharge of heat into a waterway was not expressly allowed by the
permit.100 The Fourth Circuit rejected the district court’s interpretation and
application of the CWA.101 Instead, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the
scope of a NPDES permit includes not only the permit’s express language,
but also implicit references to pollutant discharges not listed in the permit
that were revealed through the disclosures made during the application,
monitoring, and reporting phases.102
Under a Chevron analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that because the
CWA provision in question, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k), is ambiguous, and
because the EPA’s interpretation of this provision is reasonable, courts
must defer to it in evaluating the scope of a NPDES permit.103 The EPA in
Ketchikan clearly adopted the interpretation that, when NPDES permit
holders provide adequate disclosures to the permitting authority about the
nature of their discharges, the discharge of pollutants not expressly listed
in their NPDES permits is acceptable.104 The Fourth Circuit’s decision to

97. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. City Comm'rs, 268 F.3d 255, 268 (4th Cir. 2001).
98. Id. at 267.
99. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 266.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Rich, supra note 93, at 274.
103. Id. at 260.
104. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d 267 (In step two of Chevron, the Piney
Run court observed that “the EPA has promulgated, pursuant to a formal
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include references to pollutant discharges during the reporting and
disclosure stage provides an important distinction for permit applicants.
First, it incentivizes permit-seeking applicants to disclose all
pollutants and byproducts resulting from its industrial process to the
permit issuing authority. The more information disclosed, the more tools
a permitting authority can use to make the necessary effluent limitation
determinations. Second, the Fourth Circuit creates test binds lower courts
within the circuit and holds far more persuasiveness in the federal courts
rather than the test being isolated to an administrative adjudication within
the EPA.
Courts have relied on the Piney Run test time and time again when
determining the scope of NPDES permits and the proper application of the
CWA’s “permit shield” provision.105 This test, as well as the expectations
of NPDES permit holders, now appears weakened by a recent Fourth
Circuit decision and the resulting circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth
circuits.106
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE PERMIT SHIELD AND STATE WATER
QUALITY
The current split between the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit
involves similar issues regarding NPDES permit discharge limitations and
state water quality issues. While these issues may be similar, the two vastly
different conclusions between the circuits warrant scrutiny and need
reconciliation.
A. Fourth Circuit Dents the Shield
The Fourth Circuit in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v.
Fola Coal Co. held that provisions in a NPDES permit that incorporate
state water quality standards rise to the level of independent, enforceable
requirements that require compliance if the permit holder wishes to invoke
the permit shield defense.107 In Fola, an environmental citizen group
alleged that Fola, a coal operator, violated its NPDES permit by
discharging excessive amounts of sulfate pollution into the waters of West

adjudication, an interpretation of the permit shield provision that is reasonable.
The EPA is authorized both to administer and enforce the CWA”).
105. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Fola Coal Co., LLC, 845 F.3d 133, 139
(4th Cir. 2017).
106. Id. at 140.
107. Id. at 143.
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Virginia.108 Fola’s NPDES permit did not contain any express limitations
on conductivity or sulfates, although, in its application for renewal of its
permit, Fola submitted conductivity and sulfate measurements that
revealed aviolation of state water quality standards.109
As expected, Fola asserted the permit shield defense in response to
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition’s civil lawsuit.110 The district court
concluded that the permit shield defense did not apply to Fola’s case
because Fola violated a section of its permit that incorporated by reference
a West Virginia general water quality standard applicable to coal-related
NPDES permits.111 Specifically, one of the seven subparts of the
incorporated state water quality standard stated that discharges covered by
a West Virginia NPDES permit cannot impact the water source in a way
that would violate applicable water quality standards enacted by the state
permitting authority.112
The district court concluded that this incorporated reference in the
permit prohibited Fola, and other permittees subject to this permit, from
discharging pollutants that violated state water quality standards to the
same effect that effluent limitations limit pollutant discharges.113 Thus, the
district court believed the permit’s incorporation of water quality
standards provided additional effluent limitations that were enforceable in
CWA citizen suits.114 Upon a de novo review,115 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that state water quality
standards incorporated by reference into Fola's NPDES permit were an
enforceable permit condition.116 This holding resulted from the court’s
examination of the permit’s language and its cross-reference to state water
quality.
The cross-referenced language at issue, according to the Fourth
Circuit, was a straightforward, independent permit condition that prohibits
permittees from discharging water that violates water quality standards
regardless of the specific effluent limits that are applied to the permit.117
The court further distinguished Fola’s permit from the permit at issue in
108. Id. at 136.
109. Douglas J. Crouse, A Dent in the Clean Water Act’s Permit Shield, 32SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 54 (2017).
110. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d at 133.
111. Id.
112. W. VA. CODE R. § 47-30-5.1(f) (2010).
113. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d at138.
114. Id. at 145.
115. Id. at 147.
116. Id.
117. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d at 137.
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Piney Run, which did not require independent compliance with state water
quality standards.118 The Piney Run permit only provided regulations for
numerical effluent limitations, and the court addressed how the permit
shield applied to pollutants not listed in the permit.119 As far as the
language included in an NPDES permit, the Piney Run court concluded
that permit holders must comply with all aspects of the permit in order to
avail themselves of the permit shield defense.120 The Fourth Circuit found
that NPDES permitting authorities have never been precluded from
incorporating water quality standards into its permits. As a result, the
Court found that Fola was in violation of its permit and the permit shield
defense was inapplicable in the case.
B. The Sixth Circuit Holds Fast
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard
that the NPDES provision of the CWA seeks not to limit every pollutant,
but instead intends to restrict the most harmful pollutants, and otherwise
relies on an applicant's disclosures.121 The Sixth Circuit’s rationale
indicates that compliance with specific effluent limitations imposed on a
permit would also qualify as compliance with any permit condition that
requires water quality standards to be maintained.122
The court reasoned that, if such were not the case, the EPA would have
to identify not just the pollutants discharged by a single permittee but “all
of the pollutants and combinations of pollutants that could be discharged”
by all permittees who may later fall under the general permit.123 In ICG
Hazard, a coal mine in Kentucky discharged pollutants, including
selenium, into waters of the United States.124 The mine had an EPAapproved and state-issued NPDES general permit that mandated a onetime sampling for selenium during the five-year lifespan of the general
permit.125 In anticipation of seeking permit coverage for an expansion of
118. Id. at 133.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281, 290–91 (6th Cir. 2015).
122. Eric Boyd & Paul Sonderegger, New Circuit Split Raises Questions About
‘Permit Shield’ Defense in Clean Water Act Cases, THOMPSON COBURN, LLP
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/KBT6-8CR6.
123. Ross Woessner, Sixth Circuit Extends Permit Shield Test to General
Permits VINSON & ELKINS: ENVTL. BLOG (Apr. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/FF65EY7E.
124. Sierra Club, 781 F.3d at 281.
125. Woessner, supra note 123.
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mining operations, ICG Hazard sampled for selenium and confirmed that
its discharges contained the pollutant.126 Sierra Club asserted that selenium
was not authorized by the general permit nor could the discharge of
selenium have been reasonably contemplated by the state when it issued
the permit.127
The Sixth Circuit concluded that permittees that have applied for and
received NPDES permit coverage under an NPDES general permit are
entitled to raise the permit shield as a defense to third-party citizen suits.128
The ICG Hazard court concluded that EPA’s rationale for applying the
permit shield to unlisted but disclosed pollutants, as described by the
EAB129 in Ketchikan, was equally applicable to general permits.”130 The
ICG Hazard court stated that the reasoning applies “with even more force
when dealing with general permits.”131 Sierra Club subscribed to a
different view with respect to disclosure requirements for a general
NPDES permit.
Sierra Club argued that “the permitting authority lacked detailed
information about individual discharges when issuing a general permit
[and] the scope of a general permit is defined by the effluent limitations
present in the permit;” therefore, the scope of the permit shield for a
general permit should be “narrower than the shield of an individual
permit.”132 The Sixth Circuit noted that the permitting agency did indeed
contemplate the discharge of selenium, because of the state-monitoring
requirement that required an initial, albeit one-time, test for selenium at
some point during the five-year period of permit coverage.133 The court
found this fact relevant in light of the differences between individual and
general NPDES permits.
The court distinguished between the requirements of individual
permits and general permits during the NPDES application process.134 An
individual permit requires the permit applicant to disclose information
about potential pollutants and imposes liability if the applicant fails to
126. Douglas A. Henderson, The Clean Water Act Permit Shield – Recent
Battles, NRE (2015), https://perma.cc/J229-DCC8.
127. Id.
128. Sierra Club, 781 F.3d at283.
129. EAB refers to the U.S. EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board. For more
information, see https://perma.cc/3GXY-K4H6.
130. Sierra Club, 781 F.3d at 286–88.
131. Id. at 281.
132. Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146140, at *12
(E.D. Ky. Sep. 28, 2012).
133. Rich, supra note 93.
134. Id. at 252.
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disclose appropriate information.135A general permit, on the other hand,
requires very minimal information from the facility during the permitting
phase; and it is the duty of the permit writer within the permit issuing
authority to request any additional information.136 The general permit did
not require up-front disclosure of selenium, but the permittee did disclose
the selenium discharge when seeking to modify its permit coverage.
The ICG Hazard court concluded that the discharge of selenium from
coal mines covered by the general permit was clearly contemplated by the
state permitting agency.137 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the permittee
satisfied both prongs of the Piney Run test and thus was entitled to raise
the permit shield as a defense to third-party citizen suits.138
IV. A FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT DIVIDES THE JUDICIARY AND OBSCURES
THE PERMIT SHIELD

The federal circuit split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits raises
numerous questions about just how far the permit shield defense extends
with respect to NPDES general permits.139 The Supreme Court should
clarify the ambiguous status of state water quality standards under the
Clean Water Act to provide facilities, state permitting authorities, and
courts with proper guidance on the application of the CWA permit shield
defense when a state water quality standard exists as an incorporated part
of a NPDES general permit.
The outcome in Fola raises questions that plagued early provisions of
the CWA prior to its substantive amendments.140 At one time, the CWA
focused exclusively on maintaining water quality standards.141 But,
regulators found it nearly impossible to determine to what degree water
quality standards fell below acceptable limits and had been violated to
determine the identity of the alleged violators.142 Subsequent amendments
to the CWA led to fundamental changes with respect to federal regulation
of water pollution, namely the creation of the NPDES permitting
system.143 Indeed, the CWA now seeks to improve the waters of America
through a two-prong approach intended to focus directly on limiting the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Crouse, supra note 109.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 265.
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discharge of pollutants into the water instead of assessing violations of
water quality standards ex post effluent discharges.144 The first prong seeks
to ensure that point source discharges comply with initial effluent
discharge limitations that reflect the implementation of the best pollutant
control technology available, regardless of the type of pollutant
discharged.145 The second prong commands a more particularized—and
some would argue intrusive—inquiry that focuses on the type of pollutant
that is discharged.146 The application of the second prong, of course, is not
without its complexity as it involves decision making at both the federal
and state level.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Fola highlights the underlying
tension between effluent limitation guidelines and state water quality
standards. The pollutant discharge limits provided by NPDES permits
largely draw from the EPA’s technology-based and regulatory effluent
limitation guidelines, but these guidelines alone do not totally encompass
the entire discharge limit imposed by state permit issuing authorities.147
State water quality standards, which section 303 of the CWA requires
every state adopt and submit to the EPA for approval, also impact the
formation of NPDES discharge limits.148 The regulated parties—always
the NPDES permit holders—must maintain compliance with the EPA
effluent limitation guidelines or with discharge limitations issued by the
state permitting authority, including the applicable state water quality
standards, whichever regulation is more stringent.149
While state water quality standards are federally required under the
CWA and approved by the EPA, these standards are established and
mostly dependent on state-law mechanisms for promulgation and
enforcement.150 That being the case, state law is not the controlling force
with respect to state water quality standards. The Supreme Court
recognized in Arkansas v. Oklahoma that “state water-quality standards—
promulgated by States with substantial guidance from the EPA and
approved by the Agency—are part of the federal law of water
pollution.”151 This decision falls squarely on the “federal” side of the

144. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204
F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2000)).
145. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 37.
146. Id.
147. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d at 139.
148. Id. at 136.
149. Id.
150. CRAIG, supra note 31, at 55.
151. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992).
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federal-state model of cooperative federalism that exists as the core the
CWA.
If state water quality standards are part of a broader realm of federal
law under the CWA, then it is not likely that state water quality standards
would be preempted by federal law under the federal Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, because both state water quality standards and EPA
federal water standards comprise two different “federal” regulations, thus
eliminating any state-federal preemption tension.152 In the event of a
conflict between the EPA’s water quality standards and a state’s water
quality standard, the EPA could invoke its power of review and veto under
the CWA in order to adjust the standards to resolve the conflict.153
Unfortunately, conflict resolutions are not always cut and dry. Disputes
over a state’s incorporation of state water quality standards and NPDES
permits often fall on the shoulders of federal courts, which engage in a
highly complex analysis when deciding a conflict between two federal
laws.154
While states have the primary responsibility of developing water
quality standards within their respective jurisdictions, these standards
must be reviewed, updated, and approved every three years to comply with
current federal standards and EPA regulations.155 If a state’s water quality
standards are inconsistent with a federal water quality standard, the state
must determine if a revision of its standards is feasible; if such a revision
is feasible, the state must revise its standards.156
With this background in mind, it is important to understand a critical
point not addressed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Fola with respect
to the West Virginia permitting authority and the permit at issue.157 As
previously discussed,158 the Fola court held that an NPDES permit holder
could not invoke the permit shield defense because its pollutant discharges
violated state water quality standards, despite the fact that the permit
holder disclosed its pollutants during the permit application phase and the
West Virginia permit issuing authority’s decision not to impose specific
effluent limitations on the pollutant discharge at issue. Notably absent in
the Fourth Circuit’s discussion was the federal law that prohibits the
issuance of an NPDES permit by a permit issuing authority unless the

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

CRAIG, supra note 31, at 27.
GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 7.
CRAIG, supra note 31, at 27.
Id.
40 C.F.R. § 131.20(a).
Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d at 139.
See Discussion supra Section III(A).
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permitting agency finds the discharge will satisfy the relevant state and
federal water quality standards.159
Fola effectively received an NPDES permit with the presumption that
its pollutant discharges would satisfy the narrative water quality standard
incorporated by reference into its permit. It is important to keep in mind
that it was the West Virginia permit issuing authority that declined to issue
any kind of numeric limitation on Fola’s sulfate pollutant discharges. It is
also worth mentioning that, after the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the West
Virginian legislature sought to revise its water quality standards, but this
effort ended when the EPA flagged these standards for review and delayed
the revision process.160 This tension is further evident in the mandate that
a NPDES permit holder must comply with the stricter of the competing
regulations—whether it be the effluent limitation or the water quality
standard.161 Under Fola, the question becomes: must an NPDES permit
holding facility comply with stricter, seemingly unattainable water quality
standards incorporated into its NPDES permit by reference simply because
a permit issuing authority failed to include effluent limitation guidelines
necessary for a discharge to meet the applicable state water quality
standards? In light of Fola, the answer is unclear.
From the perspective of a facility or permit holder, the aforementioned
circuit split raises numerous regulatory and financial concerns.162 The
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Fola should rightfully place facilities on notice
that the CWA “permit shield” defense may be narrowed or rendered
unavailable in certain circumstances.163 Particularly in Fola’s case, one
might be sympathetic to the apparent “lose-lose” situation in which the
permit holder found itself. One potential solution would be for companies
to shift away from general permits to individual permits. Indeed, it may be
safer for a facility to seek coverage under an individual permit, where the
scope of the shield is heavily dependent on numerical, facility-specific
effluent limitations and disclosures during the application process.164 As
previously stated, general permits still widely issue and often save

159. Barnard, Early, & Phillips, The Permit Shield Defense: What the Fourth
Circuit Did Not Address in Ohio Valley (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.hklaw.com/
energyblog/the-permit-shield-defense-what-the-fourth-circuit-did-not-address-inohio-valley-01-25-2017/.
160. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
161. Id.
162. Boyd & Sonderegger, supra note 122.
163. Id.
164. Henderson, supra note 126.
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administrative resources and time when a general permit applies to
multiple facilities of the same kind within a geographic area.165
However, in some cases, a facility’s discharge may not fit the mold of
a general permit. If the general permit’s language does not cover the types
of pollutant discharges contemplated by the facility, it is necessary to
obtain an individual permit to avoid unlawful discharges under the
CWA.166 While a facility could switch to an individual permit, a
clarification of the permit shield’s applicability to general permits is still
necessary.167 The Supreme Court could take one of many approaches to
solve this federal circuit split.
The Supreme Court could adopt the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Fola
as the new “permit shield” protection standard. Under Fola, a polluting
facility could comply with the numerical limitations on effluent discharges
to the numerical limit, disclose all pollutants to the permitting agency,
reasonably rely on the EPA’s interpretation of the permit shield in
Ketchikan and the Fourth Circuit’s two-part reasonability test in Piney
Run, and nevertheless be found liable under ICG Hazard if the facility
violates state water quality standards incorporated by reference into its
general permit.168
This type of “all or nothing” standard can lead to inequitable results,
particularly because an NPDES permit lasts five years, and state water
quality standards are up for review every three years.169 It does not take
much imagination to recognize that if a state incorporates environmental
water quality standards by reference into an individual permit and
subsequently revises those water quality standards to be more stringent, a
facility could be forced to comply with stricter standards during the life of
the same issued permit. This could potentially prevent facilities from
attaining anchored expectations when applying for NPDES permits and
creates confusion on how precisely to comply with an issued permit.
Indeed, a stricter standard could cause affected companies to divest and
relocate to a different state as a result.170
165. Joel M. Gross & Kerri L. Stelcen, CLEAN WATER ACT 33 (2d ed. 2012).
166. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 7.
167. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 10, at 33.
168. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d 133.
169. EARNHART & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21. See Rich, supra note 93.
170. Brief for American Forest & Paper Association, American Petroleum
Institute, National Association of Clean Water Agencies, National Association of
Home Builders, National Association of Manufacturers, National Mining
Association, and Utility Water Act Group as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc., v. Fola Coal Co., LLC, 82 F. Supp. 3d 673 (2015)
(No. 2:13-5006), 2016 WL 1622091.
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V. CREATING A SAFE HARBOR WITHIN STATE WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS
In light of this ambiguity in an already complicated statute, the
Supreme Court should adopt the Fourth Circuit’s approach to state water
quality standards in the Fola case, subject to a “safe harbor” limitation
under the CWA “permit shield” provision. The CWA exists for one
purpose—to protect the waters of America from pollutants.171 The NPDES
permit is the regulatory exception to the strict liability prohibition of
discharging pollutants from point sources into waterbodies.172
The Fourth Circuit in Fola correctly noted that there is no limitation
on a state incorporating its state water quality standards as an independent
permit provision into an NPDES general permit.173 Congressional intent,
while unclear and even silent on many provisions of the CWA, is perfectly
clear when it comes to the application of NPDES—it should be primarily
a state function to administer a permitting system.174 Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit in Fola correctly noted that to be eligible for the CWA
permit shield defense, a facility must comply with all elements of an
NPDES permit; and a cross-reference to state water quality standards
constitutes a separate, independent section of the permit that a facility must
follow to be in compliance.175
As previously discussed,176 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) mandates that
NPDES permits may not issue if the permit issuing authority finds that the
permit holder’s discharges would violate state and federal water quality
standards.177 If an NPDES permit issues, as in Fola, and the issuing agency
does not proscribe any type of numerical effluent limitation on a pollutant
discharge that results in a state water quality violation, the NPDES permit
holder receives protection under the permit shield provision.178
Facilities already have a limited “safe harbor” with respect to their
numerical effluent discharge limits under the interpretation of the permit
shield provision; however, facilities may be exposed to liability if an
NPDES permit incorporates state water quality standards that

171. GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 7.
172. Id. at 13–14.
173. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d at 133 (quoting Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. City
Comm’rs, 268 F.3d 255,268 (4th Cir. 2001)).
174. CRAIG, supra note 31, at 55.
175. Rich, supra note 93.
176. See Discussion supra Section I(A)(1)
177. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (1995).
178. 845 F.3d at 143.
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subsequently change during the life of the existing NPDES permit.179 A
state permitting authority cannot change effluent limitations during the
course of an active NPDES permit and reasonably expect to bring an
enforcement action. A “safe harbor” should also apply to a state’s water
quality standards incorporated into an NPDES general permit. If a state
incorporates these water quality standards in an NPDES permit, a facility
should be required to follow the standards in place at the time the permit
was issued, and should not be penalized in a subsequent enforcement
action where the state water quality standards changed prior to permit
expiration.
Additionally, states should strive to include more than just boilerplate
language, which can lead to ambiguity and uncertainty as standards
evolve. States would be better served to explicitly designate in permits the
minimum requirements envisioned for adequately meeting state water
quality standards. For example, in the Fola decision, the language included
in the West Virginia permit referencing state water quality standards
contained vague and amorphous language.180 The broader the language,
the more potential for ambiguity, and the more likely confusion and
uncertainty will occur downstream.
From an environmental perspective, the waters of the United States
are often their own unique ecosystems. The waters of Bayou Lafourche in
Louisiana are unlike the waters of Lake Michigan; the waters of
Chesapeake Bay have different needs than the waters of Puget Sound.
Different state water quality standards have different needs based on a
multitude of geographic, demographic, and environmental factors. While
the scope of the permit shield provision is narrower now than at its
inception, the spirit of the CWA is still very much alive through a narrow
construction of the permit shield. States should actively incorporate their
state water quality standards into their general NPDES permits, subject to
the permit issuing authority providing regulatory guidance to the regulated
parties.
This narrowing of the CWA’s permit shield provision dents the scope
of the permit shield, but it is far from a fatal blow. The ability for a facility
to obtain immunity from liability from suit under the CWA outweighs, in
many cases, the cost of compliance.181

179. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2019).
180. “[m]aterials in concentrations which are harmful, hazardous or toxic to
man, animal or aquatic life” or “[a]ny other condition . . . which adversely alters
the integrity of the waters of the State.” Id. § 47-2-3.2.e, 3.2.i.
181. Rich, supra note 93.

610

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VII

CONCLUSION
The federal courts, permit issuing authorities, and industry stakeholders
need a clear interpretation of the ambiguous CWA “permit shield”
provision’s application to state water quality standards that are incorporated
into an NPDES permit. State permitting authorities in cooperation with the
EPA should be allowed to incorporate state water quality standards as
independent permit provisions that provide clearly defined state water
quality limits, which serve to provide an “outer limit” on the allowable level
of pollutants in a water source. Further, the permit shield should apply even
when an NDPES permit issuing authority decides not to set effluent
numerical limitations on pollutant discharges, and instead only relies on a
facility’s disclosure of pollutants during the permit application process. This
can be accomplished by avoiding boilerplate language in permits and
providing permit holding facilities the ability to anchor their compliance
expectations prior to and during the permit application process, rather than
respond to lawsuits or enforcement actions brought as a result of ambiguity
and misunderstandings of statutory requirements. Providing these additional
steps for polluting facilities to follow, subject to a safe harbor provision, can
uphold standards within the CWA and provide industry facilities with
guidance to the steps necessary for compliance.
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